Deterrence in the gray zone

The conflict in Ukraine has led to an increase in the dispute in the gray zone between Russia and most European Union countries (excluding Hungary). This situation is likely to continue, so it is important to present some keys to deterrence within the conflict in the gray zone. In the following lines, I will outline some ideas in a simple way. Those interested in delving deeper into the topic can read my article in the Revista Española de Ciencia Política (Spanish Journal of Political Science), which can be downloaded in PDF from this link or read directly on its website from this other link.

Firstly, deterrence in the gray zone must be non-escalatory. The aim is to create strategic stability by limiting instability at lower levels of the conflict. It is therefore necessary to see the stability-instability paradox in a positive light: instability is channelled to where it can cause the least harm. At the same time, to avoid spirals and security dilemmas, deterrence must be tailored to the actor and offer guarantees. Tailored deterrence requires knowledge of the other party’s strategic culture, their ultimate goals, how real the incompatibility of interests is, and exploring peaceful conflict resolution, as well as the various variables that affect their cost and risk calculation.

Making an effort to understand the mindset of the other actor is useful in two ways. On the one hand, it minimizes the risk of unintended escalation, avoiding misunderstandings and offering guarantees for one’s own security if certain limits are respected. On the other hand, it allows for a more effective use of different power instruments by turning them into deterrent capabilities, both in terms of denial and retaliation. Knowledge of the other party’s value system allows for the creation of deterrent threats that are in line with it, touching the right keys by influencing the potential aggressor’s cost-benefit calculation. In parallel, the range of comprehensive responses must comply with the State’s legal framework and international law to maintain its own legitimacy and facilitate the other actor’s return to peaceful competition.

The second key to effective deterrence in the gray zone is to ensure credibility by increasing capacity, determination, and communication. Military tools are less effective in the gray zone, where strategic stability is extended towards lower thresholds with non-military capabilities. Three considerations regarding capacity are that military capabilities preventing conventional war are necessary, military capabilities within the gray zone must be effective and non-escalatory, and a comprehensive approach must be used to identify the most effective tools for deterrence.

Determination must be widely shared politically and socially, as division hinders effective responses, while a shared vision reinforces credibility. International support for the deterrer’s cause and a common response within the framework of an alliance also reinforce credibility. Communication must overcome the non-attribution of hostile actions, using triangulation with the strategic context and operational capacity to identify the authorship of numerous actions.

Regarding communication as an essential element of deterrence, the initial hurdle to overcome is the attribution of the adversary’s hostile actions. However, as the situation intensifies, the blurring of authorship becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. The strategic context and operational capacity allow for triangulation with a reasonable degree of certainty regarding the authorship of numerous actions. For instance, while Saudi Arabia could not determine whether the missiles that hit the Abqaiq energy facility in September 2019 were launched from Iran or from Iraqi territory, there were little doubts about Tehran’s ultimate responsibility. Similar doubts have arisen with various sabotage attacks on merchant ships in the Persian Gulf in the years 2019 and 2020, while Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs have been subjected to various physical and cyber attacks, assassinations of officials, and even a drone bombing that took off from Iranian territory. The strategic context and operational capabilities make Iranian accusations against Israel quite plausible. Triangulating through the strategic context and operational capacity would lead us to believe that Russia is responsible for the Nord Stream sabotage at the end of September of this year, although a lack of evidence and possibly the desire to avoid escalation has prevented the European Union from specific retaliation at the time of writing.

A second challenge that communication faces is how to make it credible and non-escalatory simultaneously. Excessive emphasis on avoiding escalation weakens deterrence and strategic stability itself. To influence the potential deterred party’s calculation of costs and risks, the adversary must perceive that the situation is genuinely dangerous and the deterrent is willing to escalate. Such communication can be public or discreet, drawing clear red lines or playing with ambiguity. Each option has its pros and cons.

Cumulative deterrence aims to impose itself through multiple unfriendly interactions and convey the need to respect certain limits in the gray zone. When both general and immediate deterrence fails, cumulative deterrence assumes that the gray zone conflict will be stabilized through a learning process where norms of conduct, or ‘rules of the game’ are established. This is exemplified by the interactions between Israel and Hezbollah on the Lebanon border, where cumulative deterrence has kept the conflict within the gray zone except for the escalation of the Shiite militia in July 2006, which led to war. Cumulative deterrence generates tactical successes that shape the environment towards a stable strategic situation. To delve deeper into the theory of deterrence in the gray zone, the full article is available on the website of the Revista Española de Ciencia Política (Spanish Journal of Political Science).